zhongwei/gh-agentsecops-secopsagentkit

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VQL Query Patterns for Incident Response

Comprehensive VQL query patterns for common incident response and threat hunting scenarios.

Process Analysis
Network Forensics
File System Analysis
Registry Forensics
Memory Analysis
Event Log Analysis
Persistence Mechanisms
Lateral Movement Detection
Data Exfiltration
Malware Analysis

Process Analysis

Suspicious Process Detection

-- Processes with suspicious characteristics
SELECT Pid, Ppid, Name, CommandLine, Username, Exe, CreateTime
FROM pslist()
WHERE (
  -- Suspicious parent-child relationships
  (Ppid IN (SELECT Pid FROM pslist() WHERE Name =~ "(?i)(winword|excel|powerpnt|acrobat)")
   AND Name =~ "(?i)(powershell|cmd|wscript|cscript)")

  -- Processes running from temp directories
  OR Exe =~ "(?i)(temp|tmp|appdata)"

  -- Processes with obfuscated command lines
  OR CommandLine =~ "(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|downloadstring|webclient|hidden|bypass)"
)

Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins)

-- Detect abuse of legitimate Windows binaries
SELECT Pid, Name, CommandLine, Username, Exe
FROM pslist()
WHERE (
  -- certutil for downloading
  (Name =~ "(?i)certutil" AND CommandLine =~ "(?i)(urlcache|url)")

  -- bitsadmin for downloading
  OR (Name =~ "(?i)bitsadmin" AND CommandLine =~ "(?i)(transfer|download)")

  -- mshta for code execution
  OR (Name =~ "(?i)mshta" AND CommandLine =~ "(?i)(http|javascript|vbscript)")

  -- rundll32 suspicious usage
  OR (Name =~ "(?i)rundll32" AND CommandLine =~ "(?i)(javascript|url)")
)

Process Injection Detection

-- Identify potential process injection
SELECT Pid, Name,
       AllocatedMemory,
       ProtectionFlags,
       Handles
FROM handles()
WHERE Type = "Section"
  AND ProtectionFlags =~ "EXECUTE"
  AND Name != ""

Network Forensics

External Connections

-- All external network connections with process context
SELECT Laddr.IP AS LocalIP,
       Laddr.Port AS LocalPort,
       Raddr.IP AS RemoteIP,
       Raddr.Port AS RemotePort,
       Status, Pid,
       process_tracker_get(id=Pid).Name AS ProcessName,
       process_tracker_get(id=Pid).Exe AS ProcessPath,
       process_tracker_get(id=Pid).CommandLine AS CommandLine
FROM netstat()
WHERE Status = "ESTABLISHED"
  AND Raddr.IP != ""
  AND Raddr.IP !~ "^(10\\.|172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\\.|192\\.168\\.)" -- Exclude RFC1918
  AND Raddr.IP !~ "^(127\\.|169\\.254\\.)" -- Exclude localhost and link-local

Unusual Port Activity

-- Connections on unusual ports
SELECT Raddr.IP AS RemoteIP,
       Raddr.Port AS RemotePort,
       COUNT(*) AS ConnectionCount,
       GROUP_CONCAT(DISTINCT process_tracker_get(id=Pid).Name) AS Processes
FROM netstat()
WHERE Status = "ESTABLISHED"
  AND Raddr.Port NOT IN (80, 443, 22, 3389, 445, 139, 53)
GROUP BY Raddr.IP, Raddr.Port
HAVING ConnectionCount > 5

DNS Query Analysis

-- Suspicious DNS queries
SELECT query AS Domain,
       response AS IPAddress,
       timestamp(epoch=Time) AS QueryTime
FROM parse_evtx(filename="C:/Windows/System32/winevt/Logs/Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE System.EventID.Value = 3008
  AND (
    -- Long domain names (possible DGA)
    length(query) > 50

    -- High entropy domains
    OR query =~ "[a-z0-9]{20,}"

    -- Suspicious TLDs
    OR query =~ "\\.(tk|ml|ga|cf|gq)$"
  )

File System Analysis

Recently Modified Executables

-- Executables modified in last 7 days
SELECT FullPath, Size,
       timestamp(epoch=Mtime) AS ModifiedTime,
       timestamp(epoch=Ctime) AS CreatedTime,
       hash(path=FullPath, accessor="file") AS SHA256
FROM glob(globs=[
  "C:/Windows/System32/**/*.exe",
  "C:/Windows/SysWOW64/**/*.exe",
  "C:/Users/*/AppData/**/*.exe",
  "C:/ProgramData/**/*.exe"
])
WHERE Mtime > timestamp(epoch=now() - 604800) -- 7 days
ORDER BY Mtime DESC

Webshell Detection

-- Potential webshells in web directories
SELECT FullPath, Size,
       timestamp(epoch=Mtime) AS ModifiedTime,
       read_file(filename=FullPath, length=1000) AS Content
FROM glob(globs=[
  "C:/inetpub/wwwroot/**/*.asp",
  "C:/inetpub/wwwroot/**/*.aspx",
  "C:/inetpub/wwwroot/**/*.php",
  "C:/xampp/htdocs/**/*.php"
])
WHERE Content =~ "(?i)(eval|base64_decode|exec|shell_exec|system|passthru|WScript\\.Shell)"
  OR FullPath =~ "(?i)(cmd|shell|upload|backdoor|c99)"

Suspicious File Timestamps

-- Files with timestamp anomalies (timestomping detection)
SELECT FullPath,
       timestamp(epoch=Mtime) AS ModifiedTime,
       timestamp(epoch=Ctime) AS ChangeTime,
       timestamp(epoch=Btime) AS BornTime
FROM glob(globs="C:/Users/**/*.exe")
WHERE Mtime < Btime  -- Modified time before birth time (anomaly)
   OR Ctime < Btime  -- Change time before birth time

Registry Forensics

Autorun Locations

-- Comprehensive autorun registry key enumeration
SELECT Key.FullPath AS RegistryPath,
       ValueName,
       ValueData.value AS Value,
       timestamp(epoch=Key.Mtime) AS LastModified
FROM read_reg_key(globs=[
  "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/Run/*",
  "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/RunOnce/*",
  "HKEY_CURRENT_USER/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/Run/*",
  "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/WOW6432Node/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/Run/*",
  "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SYSTEM/CurrentControlSet/Services/*"
])
WHERE ValueData.value != ""

Recent Registry Modifications

-- Recently modified registry keys in security-sensitive locations
SELECT FullPath,
       timestamp(epoch=Mtime) AS ModifiedTime
FROM glob(globs=[
  "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/**",
  "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SYSTEM/CurrentControlSet/**",
  "HKEY_CURRENT_USER/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/**"
], accessor="registry")
WHERE Mtime > timestamp(epoch=now() - 86400) -- Last 24 hours
ORDER BY Mtime DESC

AppInit DLL Injection

-- Detect AppInit DLL injection mechanism
SELECT ValueName,
       ValueData.value AS DLLPath,
       timestamp(epoch=Key.Mtime) AS LastModified
FROM read_reg_key(globs=[
  "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/Windows/AppInit_DLLs",
  "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/WOW6432Node/Microsoft/Windows NT/CurrentVersion/Windows/AppInit_DLLs"
])
WHERE ValueData.value != ""

Memory Analysis

Suspicious Memory Regions

-- Memory regions with unusual protections
SELECT Pid,
       process_tracker_get(id=Pid).Name AS ProcessName,
       Address,
       Size,
       Protection
FROM vad()
WHERE Protection =~ "EXECUTE.*WRITE" -- RWX memory (suspicious)
  AND Type = "Private"

Injected Code Detection

-- Detect potentially injected code
SELECT Pid,
       Name AS ProcessName,
       Vad.Address AS MemoryAddress,
       Vad.Protection AS Protection,
       Vad.Type AS MemoryType
FROM pslist()
LET Vad <= SELECT * FROM vad(pid=Pid)
WHERE Vad.Protection =~ "EXECUTE"
  AND Vad.Type = "Private"
  AND Vad.Name = ""

Event Log Analysis

Failed Logon Attempts

-- Failed authentication attempts
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS EventTime,
       EventData.TargetUserName AS Username,
       EventData.IpAddress AS SourceIP,
       EventData.WorkstationName AS Workstation,
       EventData.FailureReason AS Reason
FROM parse_evtx(filename="C:/Windows/System32/winevt/Logs/Security.evtx")
WHERE System.EventID.Value = 4625 -- Failed logon
ORDER BY EventTime DESC
LIMIT 1000

Privilege Escalation Events

-- Privilege elevation and sensitive privilege use
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS EventTime,
       System.EventID.Value AS EventID,
       EventData.SubjectUserName AS User,
       EventData.PrivilegeList AS Privileges
FROM parse_evtx(filename="C:/Windows/System32/winevt/Logs/Security.evtx")
WHERE System.EventID.Value IN (4672, 4673, 4674) -- Special privilege events
  AND EventData.PrivilegeList =~ "(SeDebugPrivilege|SeTcbPrivilege|SeLoadDriverPrivilege)"

Scheduled Task Creation

-- Detect scheduled task creation for persistence
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS EventTime,
       EventData.TaskName AS TaskName,
       EventData.UserContext AS RunAsUser,
       EventData.TaskContent AS TaskXML
FROM parse_evtx(filename="C:/Windows/System32/winevt/Logs/Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler%4Operational.evtx")
WHERE System.EventID.Value = 106 -- Task registered
ORDER BY EventTime DESC

Persistence Mechanisms

Comprehensive Persistence Hunt

-- Multi-vector persistence detection
LET RegistryAutoRuns = SELECT "Registry" AS Method, Key.FullPath AS Location, ValueData.value AS Value
FROM read_reg_key(globs="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/Windows/CurrentVersion/Run/*")

LET ScheduledTasks = SELECT "Scheduled Task" AS Method, FullPath AS Location, "" AS Value
FROM glob(globs="C:/Windows/System32/Tasks/**")
WHERE NOT IsDir

LET Services = SELECT "Service" AS Method, Key.Name AS Location, ImagePath.value AS Value
FROM read_reg_key(globs="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SYSTEM/CurrentControlSet/Services/**/ImagePath")

LET StartupFolders = SELECT "Startup Folder" AS Method, FullPath AS Location, "" AS Value
FROM glob(globs=[
  "C:/Users/*/AppData/Roaming/Microsoft/Windows/Start Menu/Programs/Startup/*",
  "C:/ProgramData/Microsoft/Windows/Start Menu/Programs/Startup/*"
])

SELECT * FROM chain(
  a=RegistryAutoRuns,
  b=ScheduledTasks,
  c=Services,
  d=StartupFolders
)

WMI Event Subscription Persistence

-- Detect malicious WMI event subscriptions
SELECT Name,
       EventFilter,
       Consumer,
       timestamp(epoch=CreationDate) AS Created
FROM wmi_persist()
WHERE EventFilter != "" OR Consumer != ""

Lateral Movement Detection

PsExec Activity

-- PsExec service creation and execution
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS EventTime,
       EventData.ServiceName AS ServiceName,
       EventData.ImagePath AS ExecutablePath,
       EventData.AccountName AS Account
FROM parse_evtx(filename="C:/Windows/System32/winevt/Logs/System.evtx")
WHERE System.EventID.Value = 7045 -- Service installed
  AND (
    EventData.ServiceName =~ "(?i)PSEXESVC"
    OR EventData.ImagePath =~ "(?i)(\\\\\\\\.*\\\\.*\\\\|admin\\$|c\\$)"
  )

Remote Desktop Activity

-- RDP logon activity
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS LogonTime,
       EventData.TargetUserName AS Username,
       EventData.IpAddress AS SourceIP,
       EventData.LogonType AS LogonType
FROM parse_evtx(filename="C:/Windows/System32/winevt/Logs/Security.evtx")
WHERE System.EventID.Value = 4624 -- Successful logon
  AND EventData.LogonType = 10 -- RemoteInteractive (RDP)
ORDER BY LogonTime DESC

-- Network share access from remote systems
SELECT timestamp(epoch=System.TimeCreated.SystemTime) AS AccessTime,
       EventData.SubjectUserName AS Username,
       EventData.IpAddress AS SourceIP,
       EventData.ShareName AS ShareAccessed,
       EventData.ObjectName AS FileAccessed
FROM parse_evtx(filename="C:/Windows/System32/winevt/Logs/Security.evtx")
WHERE System.EventID.Value = 5140 -- Network share accessed
  AND EventData.ShareName =~ "(?i)(ADMIN\\$|C\\$|IPC\\$)"

Data Exfiltration

Large File Transfers

-- Files copied to removable media or network shares
SELECT FullPath,
       Size,
       timestamp(epoch=Mtime) AS LastModified,
       hash(path=FullPath, accessor="file").SHA256 AS SHA256
FROM glob(globs=[
  "D:/**", -- Removable drive
  "E:/**",
  "\\\\*/**" -- Network paths
])
WHERE Size > 10485760 -- Files larger than 10MB
  AND Mtime > timestamp(epoch=now() - 86400)
ORDER BY Size DESC

USB Device History

-- USB device connection history
SELECT Key.Name AS DeviceID,
       FriendlyName.value AS DeviceName,
       timestamp(epoch=Key.Mtime) AS LastConnected
FROM read_reg_key(globs="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SYSTEM/CurrentControlSet/Enum/USBSTOR/**/FriendlyName")
ORDER BY LastConnected DESC

Cloud Storage Activity

-- Files in cloud sync directories
SELECT FullPath, Size,
       timestamp(epoch=Mtime) AS LastModified
FROM glob(globs=[
  "C:/Users/*/OneDrive/**",
  "C:/Users/*/Dropbox/**",
  "C:/Users/*/Google Drive/**"
])
WHERE Mtime > timestamp(epoch=now() - 86400)
ORDER BY Mtime DESC

Malware Analysis

Suspicious File Indicators

-- Files with malware-associated characteristics
SELECT FullPath,
       Size,
       timestamp(epoch=Mtime) AS ModifiedTime,
       hash(path=FullPath, accessor="file") AS Hashes
FROM glob(globs=[
  "C:/Windows/Temp/**/*.exe",
  "C:/Users/*/AppData/Local/Temp/**/*.exe",
  "C:/ProgramData/**/*.exe"
])
WHERE (
  -- Small executables (potential droppers)
  Size < 102400

  -- Or recently created
  OR Mtime > timestamp(epoch=now() - 3600)
)

Packed Executable Detection

-- Detect potentially packed executables (high entropy)
SELECT FullPath,
       parse_pe(file=FullPath).Entropy AS Entropy,
       parse_pe(file=FullPath).Sections AS Sections
FROM glob(globs="C:/Users/**/*.exe")
WHERE parse_pe(file=FullPath).Entropy > 7.0 -- High entropy suggests packing

Malicious Scripts

-- Suspicious PowerShell/VBS scripts
SELECT FullPath,
       Size,
       timestamp(epoch=Mtime) AS ModifiedTime,
       read_file(filename=FullPath, length=5000) AS Content
FROM glob(globs=[
  "C:/Users/**/*.ps1",
  "C:/Users/**/*.vbs",
  "C:/Users/**/*.js",
  "C:/Windows/Temp/**/*.ps1"
])
WHERE Content =~ "(?i)(invoke-expression|iex|downloadstring|webclient|bypass|hidden|encodedcommand)"

Advanced Hunting Patterns

Threat Hunting with Multiple Indicators

-- Correlate multiple suspicious indicators
LET SuspiciousProcesses = SELECT Pid, Name, CommandLine
FROM pslist()
WHERE CommandLine =~ "(?i)(bypass|hidden|encodedcommand)"

LET SuspiciousConnections = SELECT Pid, Raddr.IP AS RemoteIP
FROM netstat()
WHERE Status = "ESTABLISHED"
  AND Raddr.IP !~ "^(10\\.|172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\\.|192\\.168\\.)"

SELECT sp.Pid,
       sp.Name,
       sp.CommandLine,
       GROUP_CONCAT(sc.RemoteIP) AS ConnectedIPs
FROM SuspiciousProcesses sp
JOIN SuspiciousConnections sc ON sp.Pid = sc.Pid
GROUP BY sp.Pid

Timeline Analysis

-- Comprehensive timeline of system activity
SELECT timestamp(epoch=Timestamp) AS EventTime,
       Source,
       EventType,
       Details
FROM chain(
  a={SELECT Mtime AS Timestamp, "FileSystem" AS Source, "FileCreated" AS EventType, FullPath AS Details
     FROM glob(globs="C:/Users/**") WHERE Mtime > timestamp(epoch=now() - 86400)},
  b={SELECT System.TimeCreated.SystemTime AS Timestamp, "EventLog" AS Source,
     format(format="EventID:%v", args=System.EventID.Value) AS EventType,
     EventData AS Details
     FROM parse_evtx(filename="C:/Windows/System32/winevt/Logs/Security.evtx")
     WHERE System.TimeCreated.SystemTime > timestamp(epoch=now() - 86400)},
  c={SELECT Key.Mtime AS Timestamp, "Registry" AS Source, "KeyModified" AS EventType, Key.FullPath AS Details
     FROM glob(globs="HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/**", accessor="registry")
     WHERE Key.Mtime > timestamp(epoch=now() - 86400)}
)
ORDER BY EventTime DESC

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VQL Query Patterns for Incident Response

Table of Contents

Process Analysis

Suspicious Process Detection

Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins)

Process Injection Detection

Network Forensics

External Connections

Unusual Port Activity

DNS Query Analysis

File System Analysis

Recently Modified Executables

Webshell Detection

Suspicious File Timestamps

Registry Forensics

Autorun Locations

Recent Registry Modifications

AppInit DLL Injection

Memory Analysis

Suspicious Memory Regions

Injected Code Detection

Event Log Analysis

Failed Logon Attempts

Privilege Escalation Events

Scheduled Task Creation

Persistence Mechanisms

Comprehensive Persistence Hunt

WMI Event Subscription Persistence

Lateral Movement Detection

PsExec Activity

Remote Desktop Activity

SMB/Admin Share Access

Data Exfiltration

Large File Transfers

USB Device History

Cloud Storage Activity

Malware Analysis

Suspicious File Indicators

Packed Executable Detection

Malicious Scripts

Advanced Hunting Patterns

Threat Hunting with Multiple Indicators

Timeline Analysis

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