gh-project-codeguard-rules/skills/software-security/rules/codeguard-0-session-management-and-cookies.md

description, languages, alwaysApply

description	languages	alwaysApply
Session management and secure cookies (rotation, fixation, timeouts, theft detection)	c go html java javascript php python ruby typescript	false

rule_id: codeguard-0-session-management-and-cookies

Session Management & Cookies

Implement robust, attack-resistant session handling that prevents fixation, hijacking, and theft while maintaining usability.

Session ID Generation and Properties

• Generate session IDs with a CSPRNG; ≥64 bits of entropy (prefer 128+). Opaque, unguessable, and free of meaning.
• Use generic cookie names (e.g., id) rather than framework defaults. Reject any incoming ID not created by the server.
• Store all session data server-side; never embed PII or privileges in the token. If sensitive, encrypt server-side session store at rest.

Cookie Security Configuration

• Set Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict (or Lax if necessary for flows) on session cookies.
• Scope cookies narrowly with Path and Domain. Avoid cross-subdomain exposure.
• Prefer non-persistent session cookies (no Expires/Max-Age). Require full HTTPS; enable HSTS site-wide.

Example header:

Set-Cookie: id=<opaque>; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict; Path=/

Session Lifecycle and Rotation

• Create sessions only server-side; treat provided IDs as untrusted input.
• Regenerate session ID on authentication, password changes, and any privilege elevation. Invalidate the prior ID.
• Use distinct pre‑auth and post‑auth cookie names if framework patterns require it.

Expiration and Logout

• Idle timeout: 2–5 minutes for high-value, 15–30 minutes for lower risk. Absolute timeout: 4–8 hours.
• Enforce timeouts server-side. Provide a visible logout button that fully invalidates the server session and clears the cookie client-side.

Transport and Caching

• Enforce HTTPS for the entire session journey. Never mix HTTP/HTTPS in one session.
• Send Cache-Control: no-store on responses containing session identifiers or sensitive data.

Cookie Theft Detection and Response

• Fingerprint session context server-side at establishment (IP, User-Agent, Accept-Language, relevant sec-ch-ua where available).
• Compare incoming requests to the stored fingerprint, allowing for benign drift (e.g., subnet changes, UA updates).
• Risk-based responses:
  • High risk: require re-authentication; rotate session ID.
  • Medium risk: step-up verification (challenge); rotate session ID.
  • Low risk: log suspicious activity.
• Always regenerate the session ID when potential hijacking is detected.

Client-Side Storage

• Do not store session tokens in localStorage/sessionStorage due to XSS risk. Prefer HttpOnly cookies for transport.
• If client-side storage is unavoidable for non-session secrets, isolate via Web Workers and never expose in page context.

Framework and Multi-Cookie Scenarios

• Prefer built-in session frameworks; keep them updated and hardened.
• Validate relationships when multiple cookies participate in session state; avoid same cookie names across paths/domains.

Monitoring and Telemetry

• Log session lifecycle events (creation, rotation, termination) using salted hashes of the session ID, not raw values.
• Monitor for brute force of session IDs and anomalous concurrent usage.

Implementation Checklist

1. CSPRNG session IDs (≥64 bits entropy), opaque and server-issued only.
2. Cookie flags: Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite set; tight domain/path.
3. HTTPS-only with HSTS; no mixed content.
4. Regenerate IDs on auth and privilege changes; invalidate old IDs.
5. Idle and absolute timeouts enforced server-side; full logout implemented.
6. Cache-Control: no-store for sensitive responses.
7. Server-side fingerprinting and risk-based responses to anomalies.
8. No client storage of session tokens; framework defaults hardened.