16 KiB
name, description
| name | description |
|---|---|
| git-security-2025 | Git security best practices for 2025 including signed commits, zero-trust workflows, secret scanning, and verification |
🚨 CRITICAL GUIDELINES
Windows File Path Requirements
MANDATORY: Always Use Backslashes on Windows for File Paths
When using Edit or Write tools on Windows, you MUST use backslashes (\) in file paths, NOT forward slashes (/).
Examples:
- ❌ WRONG:
D:/repos/project/file.tsx - ✅ CORRECT:
D:\repos\project\file.tsx
This applies to:
- Edit tool file_path parameter
- Write tool file_path parameter
- All file operations on Windows systems
Documentation Guidelines
NEVER create new documentation files unless explicitly requested by the user.
- Priority: Update existing README.md files rather than creating new documentation
- Repository cleanliness: Keep repository root clean - only README.md unless user requests otherwise
- Style: Documentation should be concise, direct, and professional - avoid AI-generated tone
- User preference: Only create additional .md files when user specifically asks for documentation
Git Security Best Practices 2025
Zero-Trust Security Model (2025 Standard)
What: Every developer identity must be authenticated and authorized explicitly. All Git operations are logged, signed, and continuously monitored.
Core Principles:
- Never trust, always verify - Every commit verified
- Least privilege access - Minimal permissions required
- Continuous monitoring - All operations logged and audited
- Assume breach - Defense in depth strategies
Implementing Zero-Trust for Git
1. Mandatory Signed Commits:
# Global requirement
git config --global commit.gpgsign true
git config --global tag.gpgsign true
# Enforce via branch protection (GitHub/GitLab/Azure DevOps)
# Repository Settings → Branches → Require signed commits
2. Identity Verification:
# Every commit must verify identity
git log --show-signature -10
# Reject unsigned commits in CI/CD
# .github/workflows/verify.yml
- name: Verify all commits are signed
run: |
git log --pretty="%H" origin/main..HEAD | while read commit; do
if ! git verify-commit "$commit" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "ERROR: Unsigned commit $commit"
exit 1
fi
done
3. Continuous Audit Logging:
# Enable Git audit trail
git config --global alias.audit 'log --all --pretty="%H|%an|%ae|%ad|%s|%GK" --date=iso'
# Export audit log
git audit > git-audit.log
# Monitor for suspicious activity
git log --author="*" --since="24 hours ago" --pretty=format:"%an %ae %s"
4. Least Privilege Access:
# GitHub branch protection (zero-trust model)
branches:
main:
protection_rules:
required_pull_request_reviews: true
dismiss_stale_reviews: true
require_code_owner_reviews: true
required_approving_review_count: 2
require_signed_commits: true
enforce_admins: true
restrictions:
users: [] # No direct push
teams: ["security-team"]
5. Continuous Monitoring:
# Monitor all repository changes
# .github/workflows/security-monitor.yml
name: Security Monitoring
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
monitor:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Check for unsigned commits
run: git verify-commit HEAD || echo "::warning::Unsigned commit detected"
- name: Scan for secrets
run: gitleaks detect --exit-code 1
- name: Check commit author
run: |
AUTHOR=$(git log -1 --format='%an <%ae>')
echo "Commit by: $AUTHOR"
# Log to SIEM/security monitoring
Signed Commits (Mandatory in 2025)
Why: Cryptographically verify commit authorship, prevent impersonation, ensure audit trail.
Industry Trend: Signed commits increasingly required in 2025 workflows.
GPG Signing (Traditional)
Setup:
# Generate GPG key
gpg --full-generate-key
# Choose: RSA and RSA, 4096 bits, expires in 2y
# List keys
gpg --list-secret-keys --keyid-format=long
# Example output:
# sec rsa4096/ABC123DEF456 2025-01-15 [SC] [expires: 2027-01-15]
# uid [ultimate] Your Name <your.email@example.com>
# ssb rsa4096/GHI789JKL012 2025-01-15 [E] [expires: 2027-01-15]
# Configure Git
git config --global user.signingkey ABC123DEF456
git config --global commit.gpgsign true
git config --global tag.gpgsign true
# Export public key for GitHub/GitLab
gpg --armor --export ABC123DEF456
# Copy output and add to GitHub/GitLab/Bitbucket
# Sign commits
git commit -S -m "feat: add authentication"
# Verify signatures
git log --show-signature
git verify-commit HEAD
git verify-tag v1.0.0
Troubleshooting:
# GPG agent not running
export GPG_TTY=$(tty)
echo 'export GPG_TTY=$(tty)' >> ~/.bashrc
# Cache passphrase longer
echo 'default-cache-ttl 34560000' >> ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf
echo 'max-cache-ttl 34560000' >> ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf
gpg-connect-agent reloadagent /bye
# Test signing
echo "test" | gpg --clearsign
SSH Signing (Modern Alternative - 2023+)
Why SSH: Simpler, reuse existing SSH keys, no GPG required.
Setup:
# Check if SSH key exists
ls -la ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
# Generate if needed
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "your.email@example.com"
# Configure Git to use SSH signing
git config --global gpg.format ssh
git config --global user.signingkey ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
git config --global commit.gpgsign true
# Add public key to GitHub
cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
# GitHub Settings → SSH and GPG keys → New SSH key → Key type: Signing Key
# Sign commits (automatic with commit.gpgsign=true)
git commit -m "feat: add feature"
# Verify
git log --show-signature
Configure allowed signers file (for verification):
# Create allowed signers file
echo "your.email@example.com $(cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub)" > ~/.ssh/allowed_signers
# Configure Git
git config --global gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile ~/.ssh/allowed_signers
# Verify commits
git verify-commit HEAD
Secret Scanning & Prevention
GitHub Secret Scanning (Push Protection)
Enable in repository:
- Settings → Code security → Secret scanning → Enable
- Enable push protection (blocks secrets at push time)
AI-powered detection (2025):
- AWS credentials
- Azure service principals
- Google Cloud keys
- GitHub tokens
- Database connection strings
- API keys (OpenAI, Stripe, Anthropic, etc.)
- Private keys
- OAuth tokens
- Custom patterns
Example blocked push:
$ git push
remote: error: GH013: Repository rule violations found for refs/heads/main.
remote:
remote: - Push cannot contain secrets
remote:
remote: Resolve the following violations before pushing again
remote:
remote: — AWS Access Key
remote: locations:
remote: - config.py:12
remote:
remote: (Disable push protection: https://github.com/settings/security_analysis)
remote:
To github.com:user/repo.git
! [remote rejected] main -> main (push declined due to repository rule violations)
Fix:
# Remove secret from file
# Use environment variable instead
echo "AWS_ACCESS_KEY=your_key" >> .env
echo ".env" >> .gitignore
# Remove from history if already committed
git rm --cached config.py
git commit -m "Remove secrets"
# If in history, use filter-repo
git filter-repo --path config.py --invert-paths
git push --force
Gitleaks (Local Scanning)
Install:
# macOS
brew install gitleaks
# Linux
wget https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v8.18.0/gitleaks_8.18.0_linux_x64.tar.gz
tar -xzf gitleaks_8.18.0_linux_x64.tar.gz
sudo mv gitleaks /usr/local/bin/
# Windows
choco install gitleaks
Usage:
# Scan entire repository
gitleaks detect
# Scan uncommitted changes
gitleaks protect
# Scan specific directory
gitleaks detect --source ./src
# Generate report
gitleaks detect --report-format json --report-path gitleaks-report.json
# Use in CI/CD
gitleaks detect --exit-code 1
Pre-commit hook:
# .git/hooks/pre-commit
#!/bin/bash
gitleaks protect --staged --verbose
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
echo "⚠️ Gitleaks detected secrets. Commit blocked."
exit 1
fi
Git-secrets (AWS-focused)
# Install
brew install git-secrets # macOS
# or
git clone https://github.com/awslabs/git-secrets.git
cd git-secrets
sudo make install
# Initialize in repository
git secrets --install
git secrets --register-aws
# Add custom patterns
git secrets --add 'password\s*=\s*[^\s]+'
git secrets --add 'api[_-]?key\s*=\s*[^\s]+'
# Scan
git secrets --scan
git secrets --scan-history
Enforce Signed Commits
Branch Protection Rules
GitHub:
Repository → Settings → Branches → Branch protection rules
☑ Require signed commits
☑ Require linear history
☑ Require status checks to pass
GitLab:
Repository → Settings → Repository → Protected branches
☑ Allowed to push: No one
☑ Allowed to merge: Maintainers
☑ Require all commits be signed
Azure DevOps:
Branch Policies → Add policy → Require signed commits
Pre-receive Hook (Server-side enforcement)
#!/bin/bash
# .git/hooks/pre-receive (on server)
zero_commit="0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
while read oldrev newrev refname; do
# Skip branch deletion
if [ "$newrev" = "$zero_commit" ]; then
continue
fi
# Check all commits in push
for commit in $(git rev-list "$oldrev".."$newrev"); do
# Verify commit signature
if ! git verify-commit "$commit" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "Error: Commit $commit is not signed"
echo "All commits must be signed. Configure with:"
echo " git config commit.gpgsign true"
exit 1
fi
done
done
exit 0
Security Configuration
Recommended Git Config
# Enforce signed commits
git config --global commit.gpgsign true
git config --global tag.gpgsign true
# Use SSH signing (modern)
git config --global gpg.format ssh
git config --global user.signingkey ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
# Security settings
git config --global protocol.version 2
git config --global transfer.fsckobjects true
git config --global fetch.fsckobjects true
git config --global receive.fsckobjects true
# Prevent credential leaks
git config --global credential.helper cache --timeout=3600
# Or use system credential manager
git config --global credential.helper wincred # Windows
git config --global credential.helper osxkeychain # macOS
# Line ending safety
git config --global core.autocrlf true # Windows
git config --global core.autocrlf input # macOS/Linux
# Editor safety (avoid nano/vim leaks)
git config --global core.editor "code --wait"
.gitignore Security
# Secrets
.env
.env.*
*.pem
*.key
*.p12
*.pfx
*_rsa
*_dsa
*_ecdsa
*_ed25519
credentials.json
secrets.yaml
config/secrets.yml
# Cloud provider
.aws/
.azure/
.gcloud/
gcloud-service-key.json
# Databases
*.sqlite
*.db
# Logs (may contain sensitive data)
*.log
logs/
# IDE secrets
.vscode/settings.json
.idea/workspace.xml
# Build artifacts (may contain embedded secrets)
dist/
build/
node_modules/
vendor/
Credential Management
SSH Keys
# Generate secure SSH key
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "your.email@example.com" -f ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_work
# Use ed25519 (modern, secure, fast)
# Avoid RSA < 4096 bits
# Avoid DSA (deprecated)
# Configure SSH agent
eval "$(ssh-agent -s)"
ssh-add ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_work
# Test connection
ssh -T git@github.com
# Use different keys for different services
# ~/.ssh/config
Host github.com
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_github
Host gitlab.com
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_gitlab
HTTPS Credentials
# Use credential manager (not plaintext!)
# Windows
git config --global credential.helper wincred
# macOS
git config --global credential.helper osxkeychain
# Linux (libsecret)
git config --global credential.helper /usr/share/git/credential/libsecret/git-credential-libsecret
# Cache for limited time (temporary projects)
git config --global credential.helper 'cache --timeout=3600'
Personal Access Tokens (PAT)
GitHub:
- Settings → Developer settings → Personal access tokens → Fine-grained tokens
- Set expiration (max 1 year)
- Minimum scopes needed
- Use for HTTPS authentication
Never commit tokens:
# Use environment variable
export GITHUB_TOKEN="ghp_xxxxxxxxxxxx"
git clone https://$GITHUB_TOKEN@github.com/user/repo.git
# Or use Git credential helper
gh auth login # GitHub CLI method
CodeQL & Security Scanning
GitHub CodeQL
.github/workflows/codeql.yml:
name: "CodeQL Security Scan"
on:
push:
branches: [ main, develop ]
pull_request:
branches: [ main ]
schedule:
- cron: '0 0 * * 1' # Weekly scan
jobs:
analyze:
name: Analyze
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
security-events: write
contents: read
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
language: [ 'javascript', 'python', 'java' ]
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v3
with:
languages: ${{ matrix.language }}
queries: security-and-quality
- name: Autobuild
uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@v3
- name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v3
with:
category: "/language:${{ matrix.language }}"
Detects:
- SQL injection
- XSS vulnerabilities
- Path traversal
- Command injection
- Insecure deserialization
- Authentication bypass
- Hardcoded secrets
Audit Trail
Enable detailed logging
# Log all Git operations
git config --global alias.ll 'log --all --graph --decorate --oneline --show-signature'
# Check commit verification
git log --show-signature -10
# Export audit log
git log --pretty=format:"%H,%an,%ae,%ad,%s" --date=iso > git-audit.csv
# Verify all commits in branch
git log --show-signature main..HEAD
Security Checklist
Repository Setup:
- ☑ Enable branch protection
- ☑ Require signed commits
- ☑ Enable secret scanning with push protection
- ☑ Enable CodeQL or similar scanning
- ☑ Configure Dependabot/Renovate
- ☑ Require 2FA for all contributors
Developer Workstation:
- ☑ Use GPG or SSH commit signing
- ☑ Configure credential manager (never plaintext)
- ☑ Install and configure gitleaks
- ☑ Create comprehensive .gitignore
- ☑ Enable fsckobjects for transfers
- ☑ Use SSH keys with passphrase
Workflow:
- ☑ Never commit secrets
- ☑ Review changes before commit
- ☑ Verify signatures on pull/merge
- ☑ Regular security audits
- ☑ Rotate credentials periodically
- ☑ Use environment variables for secrets
Incident Response
Secret leaked in commit:
# 1. Rotate compromised credentials IMMEDIATELY
# 2. Remove from latest commit (if not pushed)
git reset HEAD~1
# Edit files to remove secret
git add .
git commit -m "Remove secrets"
# 3. If pushed, remove from history
git filter-repo --path config/secrets.yml --invert-paths
git push --force
# 4. Notify team to re-clone
# 5. Enable push protection to prevent future leaks
Unsigned commits detected:
# Identify unsigned commits
git log --show-signature | grep "No signature"
# Re-sign commits (if you authored them)
git rebase --exec 'git commit --amend --no-edit -n -S' -i HEAD~10
# Force push (with team coordination)
git push --force-with-lease